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EU MEMBERSHIP AND AN
INDEPENDENT BASQUE STATE
Lindsay Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
The process of establishing a union of European states be-
gan just over a half century ago.' The path to unity has
presented a multitude of challenges that have been overcome,
but many obstacles still remain on the road ahead. 2 One such
obstacle is the rise of regionalism within certain European
Union (EU) member states.3 Many of these regions have gained
various levels of independence from their respective central
governments. 4 As a result of this independence, they have de-
veloped direct relations with other European regions and EU
institutions, bypassing their central governments, and causing
many to question the need for central governments at all.5
Spain, the UK, and Italy, EU countries where nationalist re-
gions are demanding independence and the right to self-deter-
mination, 6 are clear examples of this issue. As regions such as
the Basque Country of Northern Spain, Scotland, and northern
regions of Italy represented by the Northern League party seek
* J.D. candidate, Pace University School of Law, 2008; M.A. New York Uni-
versity, 2005; B.A. Tufts University, 2004. Lindsay would like to thank her parents
for their endless support and encouragement, the 2007 and 2008 Pace Interna-
tional Law Review Editorial Boards, and all the PILR members who devoted their
time to editing this article.
1 See generally THE EUROPEAN UNION: READINGS ON THE THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C-G. Stubb eds., 2d
ed. 1998).
2 Id.
3 John Newhouse, Europe's Rising Regionalism, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-
Feb.1997, at 67.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role of Re-
gional Governments in the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L.REv.
413, 416 (1997); Lisbeth Kirk, Breakaway Regions to Lose EU Membership, Says
Prodi, EUOBsERVER, Apr. 16, 2004, http://euobserver.com (search "Breakaway Re-
gions;" then follow "Breakaway Regions" hyperlink).
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their independence, they also assert their right to retain their
status as European Union members once becoming independent
states.7 Whether EU membership would carry over to newly in-
dependent regions is an obstacle that the EU treaties have yet
to formally address., The purpose of this Comment is to con-
sider the consequences of a nationalist region gaining indepen-
dence from an existing EU member state. Specifically, it will
explore the countervailing legal arguments of the Basque Coun-
try and the Spanish state regarding EU membership policy
were the former one day to become an independent state.
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief background on
the formation of the European Union and the criteria for admit-
tance into the EU. It will consider the way in which the EU's
overall goals of having stable institutions that guarantee de-
mocracy, rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minor-
ities have shaped the entry criteria for candidate states.9 Such
criteria include the requirements that states adopt the Council
of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (commonly referred to as the European
Convention on Human Rights), 10 the United Nations Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," and the United
Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights.' 2 Part III will look specifically at the situation of
the Basque Country in Northern Spain and its desire for inde-
pendence. A historically isolated region, untouched by the suc-
cessive invasions of the Iberian Peninsula over the centuries,
the Basque Country has continually been regarded by many of
its citizens as separate and apart from the Spanish state.' 3
7 Kirk, supra note 6.
8 Id.
9 Luis L6pez Guerra, The Challenges to Candidate States, in CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 21, 23 (2002).
10 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (1950), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-
4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16 1966),
available at http://www.ohchr.orglenglish/law/ccpr.htm.
12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16 1966), available at http://www.ohchr.org/englishlaw/cescr.htm.
13 See generally Historia del Pais Vasco y del Euskara, http://www.euskalnet.
net/kondairalesp/Euskara.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
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Many Basques believe they have a right to self-determination. 14
The Spanish government has adamantly and repeatedly re-
fused the Basque claim to independence and, consequently, for
close to forty years, has endured the political violence of the ter-
rorist group ETA. 15 Part IV will analyze the arguments for al-
lowing EU membership to carry over to an independent Basque
state and the consequences such would have on newly indepen-
dent European states in general. It will focus on the ability of
the Basque Country to fulfill the entry requirements mentioned
in Part II (which are only a few of a much broader set of crite-
ria). In light of the history of political violence in the Basque
region, which is endorsed by the political groups seeking inde-
pendence, 16 and includes assassinations, kidnappings, and
bombings against the Spanish state and Basque anti-separat-
ists, this Comment will conclude in Part V that permitting EU
membership to carry over to newly formed states, which have
separated from existing member states, would directly conflict
with the EU's principal aims of democracy, respect for human
rights, and the protection of minorities. Therefore, in order to
protect its stability as a democratic institution, the European
Union should implement a policy requiring all newly indepen-
dent states to reapply for EU membership.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Formation
The European Union is the product of a decades' long en-
deavor towards integration of the European states.1 7 Through-
out this process, a consistent theme has been to create
institutions and policies commonly shared and respected by all
member states.18 Beginning in 1951 with the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), the organization of European
states was intended originally as a means of soothing Franco-
14 See El Mundo Special Section on the Basque Country, http://www.elmundo.
es/especiales/2002/lO/nacionalpaisvasco/ordago.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
15 Id.
16 El Mundo Special Section on ETA, http://www.elmundo.es/eta/entorno/in-
dex.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
17 See generally THE EUROPEAN MOSAIC 16 (David Gowland, Basil O'Neill &
Richard Dunphy eds., 2d. ed. 2000).
18 Id.
2007]
3
PACE INT'L L. REV.
German relations after World War II and rebuilding the rav-
aged French and German economies. 19 An invitation to join
was extended to Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands, and all six parties gathered in Paris to sign the Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (com-
monly referred to as the Treaty of Paris) in 1951.20
By creating the ECSC, the signatory states' intentions were
two-fold. Their immediate goal was to create a common coal
and steel market, removing all trade barriers and instituting
common policies with regard to these materials. 21 The long-
term goal envisioned by the Treaty of Paris signatories was to
ensure peace and European unity.22 The Treaty's preamble
stated that the signatories had "[R]esolved to substitute for age-
old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create,
by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader
and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody
conflicts."23 The six member states ceded control over their coal
and steel industries to four supranational institutions: the High
Authority, the Assembly, the Council, and the European Court
of Justice. 24 Each supranational institution jointly adminis-
tered the ECSC. 25 While it was a small first step, and disap-
pointing to many who had high aspirations of European unity,
the creation of the ECSC began what would become a power
union of European states.26 According to David Gowland and
Mark Cornwall, "[t]he idea of integrating first just one sector of
the western European economy promised a 'spillover' effect
leading to the integration of other sectors and ultimately to po-
litical integration."2 7
Integration continued in 1957 with the signing of the
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
19 DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION?: AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN IN-
TEGRATION 25 (2d ed. 1999).
20 Karen Davies, Understanding European Union Law 6 (2d ed. 2003).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Preamble,
Apr. 18 1951, available at http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%
20documents/Paris/TRAITES_1951-CECA.pdf.
24 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 6.
25 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 6.
26 See generally THE EUROPEAN MOSAIC, supra note 17.
27 Id. at 16.
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(Euratom Treaty).28 The six ECSC countries now committed
themselves to "the furtherance of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes" by forming the European Atomic Energy Commit-
tee. 29 As a result of Euratom, the atomic energy industries of
the six member states was now to be controlled by the Assembly
and European Court of Justice, which also oversaw the admin-
istration of the coal and steel industries, as well as a separate
High Authority and Council. 30
Simultaneous with the signing of the Euratom Treaty, the
six member states also signed the Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (commonly known as the Treaty
of Rome).31 The purpose of the European Economic Community
(EEC), or the European Community (EC) as it later came to be
known, was to create a common market in which goods, capital,
labor, and services flowed freely across the six member states.32
Like the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community,
the EC was administered by four supranational institutions,
the European Court of Justice and the Assembly, which were
shared with the other two Communities, as well as a separate
Commission and Council of Ministers. 33 The institutions gov-
erning each of these three communities were merged in 196534
through the Merger Treaty. 35 As a result, all three Communi-
ties would be administered by the same four governing institu-
tions: the Council of Ministers, the Commission (formerly
referred to as the High Authority), the European Parliament
(formerly, the Assembly), and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ).36
28 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom),
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (1958), available at http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm.
29 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 6.
30 Id. at 7.
31 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 140, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/Rome57.txt.
32 THE EUROPEAN MosAIc, supra note 17, at 17.
33 Id.
34 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 7.
35 Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities and Annexed Documents, Apr. 8, 1965, 1967 J.O. (152) 1 [here-
inafter Merger Treaty], available at http://aei.pitt.edu/5202/01/001670-l.pdf.
36 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 7.
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In the 1970s, European integration came to a virtual halt.37
A leading authority on the European Union, Desmond Dinan,
noted that in the 1970s the EC "struggled with unforeseen cir-
cumstances such as fluctuating superpower relations, apparent
U.S. decline, growing German assertiveness, oscillating ex-
change rates, and widely uneven economic performance among
the member states."38 The next major development in the way
of European unity did not come until 1986, with the signing of
the Single European Act. 39 The Single European Act (SEA)
served to jumpstart the integration process 40 by bringing in-
creased efficiency to the EC's administrative institutions. 41 The
European Parliament was granted greater legislative power
and the right to veto petitions for accession by new states;42 a
Court of First Instance was established to lighten the load of
the ECJ;43 and the member states agreed to create and imple-
ment a single European market by 1992.4 4 Also during this pe-
riod, six additional countries joined the European Community,
bringing the total number of member states to twelve by 1986. 4 5
In 1973, Britain, Denmark, and Ireland were the first to join
the six original EC members. 46 Greece was admitted in 1981,
followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. 47
In fulfillment of their goal of creating a single market, the
twelve states signed the Treaty on European Union, commonly
referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992.48 The Maastricht
Treaty had two principal aims: (1) to further European integra-
tion and (2) to create an organization founded on the original
37 Id. at 8.
38 DINAN, supra note 19, at 57.
39 Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, available at http:l!
www.unizar.es/euroconstitucionlibrary/historic%20documents/SEA/Single%2OEu-
ropean%20Act.pdf.
40 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 8.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See DAVIES, supra note 20, at 16.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Treaty on European Union (Maastrich Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C
191) 1 [hereinafter Maastrich Treaty], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/
treaties/datl11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001.
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European Communities. 49 This organization would be known
as the European Union, 50 and it would strive:
- to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and
sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without
internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and so-
cial cohesion and through the establishment of economic and
monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Treaty;
- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular
through the implementation of a common foreign and security
policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence;
- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the
nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citi-
zenship of the Union;
- to develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs;
- to maintain in full the 'acquis communautaire' and build on it
with a view to considering, through the procedure referred to in
Article N(2), to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation
introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of
ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions
of the Community. 51
While the European Union has integrated the European
signatory states, it was created as a primarily economic organi-
zation and does not presently have structures designed for the
protection of human and civil rights.52 It is therefore dependent
upon multinational agreements created outside the scope of the
EU to protect and enforce the human rights of EU citizens. Con-
sequently, an EU applicant state's accession to these treaties is
imperative when deciding whether to grant EU membership
status.53
49 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 9.
50 Id.
51 Treaty on European Union, supra note 48, art. B; see also European Union
website, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU-treaty.html.
52 Tara C. Stevers, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Ar-
gument for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919, 952 (1997).
53 UK Law Online, University of Leeds, The European Convention on Human
Rights, England, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/hamlyn/echr.htm (last visited 9 Nov.
2007).
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In this regard, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 54 took inte-
gration a step further by promoting transparency in the gov-
erning process and by declaring as the foundation of the EU
respect for fundamental rights, democracy, and rule of law. 55 It
requires that the Union respect the human rights protected
under the European Convention on Human Rights. 56 Any
member state that breaches the rights guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights will face suspension of its
rights as an EU member state.57
In 2000, the Treaty of Nice 58 was signed with the aim of
facilitating enlargement of the EU.5 9 Qualified majority voting
was extended to the Council, and the Court of First Instance
was given the authority to make preliminary rulings on certain
matters so as to lessen the burden on the ECJ.6° The EP, the
Commission, and the Committee of the Regions were granted
permission for future increase pending EU expansion to up to
twenty-seven member states.61
B. Present Structure: Institutions and Sources of Law
Five institutions share the task of governing the European
Union.6 2 Legislative, executive, and judicial functions are dis-
tributed among these governing bodies, calling for their close
interaction and cooperation.6 3 The five EU governing bodies
are the European Parliament (EP), the Council (not to be con-
fused with the Council of Europe or the European Council), the
54 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty on European Union, The Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 1, available at http://eur.lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/l1997D.
htm/11997D.html#0001010001.
55 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 11.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001,
2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/
12001C/htnC_2001080EN.000101.html.
59 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 14.
60 Id. at 13.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 18.
63 Id.
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Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the
Court of Auditors (CoA).64
i. The European Parliament
The European Parliament (formerly known as the Assem-
bly) is composed of over seven hundred delegates who are di-
rectly elected in their respective states every five years. 65 Each
member state has a fixed number of seats, which is proportion-
ate to the state's population. 66 The major political parties of
each EU member state are represented in the EP, and the
elected representatives are grouped by political affiliation
rather than by country. 67 Originally created with only a con-
sultative role in the development of EU legislation, which may
or may not have been taken into account by the other EU legis-
lative bodies, the EP now has the right to veto certain types of
legislation it deems inappropriate. 68 The EP is considered the
"watchdog of Community interests and its role is to represent
EU citizens as a whole."69 It also has a significant budgetary
role that it shares with three of the other governing institu-
tions. 70 Finally, as part of a system of checks and balances, the
EP has certain supervisory functions to oversee the other EU
institutions. 71
ii. The Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union, also called the Council
of Ministers, consists of one representative from each member
state who has the authority to bind his country legally to EU
agreements. 72 The state representative in attendance at any
given meeting depends on the nature of the discussions. 73 For
example, a member state's transport minister will attend dis-
64 Id.
65 European Parliament Role of an MEP,, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
members/public/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&id=150 (last visited Nov. 17,
2007).
66 Id.
67 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 18.
68 Id. at 19.
69 THE EUROPEAN MosAIc, supra note 17, at 90.
70 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 20.
71 Id. at 21.
72 Id. at 22.
73 Id.
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cussions on transportation, while its agriculture minister will
be present at meetings involving agriculture. 74 Like the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council of Ministers has legislative, budg-
etary, and supervisory functions. 75 However, unlike the EP, the
role of the Council is to represent the domestic interests of each
of the member states.7 6 The Council's nature is at once supra-
national and intergovernmental: 77 the ministers must answer
to their national parliaments while at the same time form part
of the EU legislative body, passing laws on behalf of the whole
of the European Union.78
iii. The Commission
The Commission is comprised of one representative from
each of the EU's twenty-seven member states. 79 Nominated by
the governments of their respective states, Commissioners must
be approved by the EP and take an oath promising to act only in
the interests of the European Union.80 Commission representa-
tives may not accept instructions from their home states.81 The
governments of each member state also appoint a President
from among the Commissioners, subject to approval by the
EP.8 2 In addition to presiding over Commission meetings, the
President attends meetings of the Council and is responsible for
representing the European Union at international summits. 8 3
The Commission primarily is charged with drafting the budget
and initial legislation, which the EP and Council then review.8 4
iv. The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice consists of one judge from
each member state who serves for a term of three years.8 5 The
judges are "appointed by the common accord of member states,
74 Id.
75 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 24.
76 Id. at 23.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 24.
80 Id. at 26.
81 Id.
82 THE EUROPEAN MosAIc, supra note 17, at 85.
83 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 26.
84 Id. at 27-28.
85 Id. at 29.
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but once appointed they are totally independent of governments
or other institutions of the Community."8 6 The Court hears
cases either brought by the Commission against EU member
states for failure to fulfill its EU obligations or by institutions or
individuals challenging the validity of EU laws.8 7 It also inter-
prets or rules on the validity of EU legislation at the request of
the member states' national courts.88 In addition, the ECJ has
the broad task of ensuring that EU law is observed.8 9
v. The Court of Auditors
Finally, the Court of Auditors, despite its name, is not a
court in the judicial sense. 90 Rather, it is responsible for moni-
toring the EU's budget.91 Before any of the EU institutions can
make expenditures from the EU treasury, they must first ob-
tain the approval of the Court of Auditors. 92
vi. Other Institutions
The various EU treaties have created additional sub-insti-
tutions to supplement the five principal governing bodies. One
such institution is the Committee of the Regions (CoR), which
was established in 1994 with two principal objectives. 93 First,
considering that three quarters of EU laws are implemented
through local or regional governments, the CoR is meant to give
a voice to local and regional leaders in the development of fu-
ture EU laws. 94 Second, the CoR is intended to maintain a con-
nection between the EU institutions and individual EU citizens
by keeping the public informed of EU developments and ensur-
ing that the EU governing bodies address the concerns of the
citizens. 95 The Committee of the Regions is required to submit
opinions to the Commission and Council regarding policies on
education and youth, culture, public health, trans-European
86 THE EUROPEAN MosmC, supra note 17, at 90.
87 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 29.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 31.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Committee of the Regions, http://www.cor.europa.eu/en/presentation/Role.
htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
94 Id.
95 Id.
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transport networks, communications and energy, economic and
social cohesion, employment, social policy, environment, and vo-
cational training.96 Representatives, or members as they are
called, from each member state are appointed by the Council to
serve a term of four years.97 The member states may not man-
date instructions for their representatives to follow, as the Com-
munity has an interest in the representatives performing their
duties independently. 98 The CoR is headed by a President and
a First-Vice President, who are elected by CoR members every
two years.99 Presently, the Committee of the Regions has 344
members and six internal commissions specializing in (1) terri-
torial cohesion, (2) economic and social policy, (3) sustainable
development, (4) culture education and research, (5) constitu-
tional affairs and European governance, and (6) external rela-
tions and decentralized cooperation. 10 0
vii. Sources of EU Law
The primary source of European Union law are the treaties
that have created the EU's basic committees and institutions,
including the Treaty of Paris, the Euratom Treaty, the Treaty of
Rome, the Maastrich Treaty, and the Treaty of Amsterdam. 10 1
Secondary legislation encompasses regulations, directives, deci-
sions, recommendations, and opinions delivered in concert by
the European Parliament, Council, and Commission. 0 2
C. Requirements for Ascension
The criteria for gaining admittance into the EU are gener-
ally defined by the Copenhagen and Madrid European Coun-
cils. 10 3 The 1993 Copenhagen European Council set three
96 Committee of the Regions, http://www.cor.europa.eu/en/index.htm (follow
"Role" hyperlink; then follow "Fact Sheet on the Committee of the Regions"
hyperlink).
97 Id. (follow "Role" hyperlink; then follow link to "Members").
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. (follow "Role" hyperlink; then follow "Fact Sheet on the Committee of
the Regions" hyperlink).
101 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 35-36.
102 Id. at 36.
103 European Commission Website on Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/en-
largement/enlargement process/accession.process/criteria/indexen.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 18, 2007).
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broad requirements that candidate countries must meet: (1)
"stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minori-
ties;" (2) "the existence of a functioning market economy, as well
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union;" and (3) "the ability to take on the obli-
gations of membership including adherence to the aims of politi-
cal, economic & monetary union."10 4 In 1995, the Madrid
European Council established the requirement that candidate
states must enable their domestic administrative structures to
be adjusted to adopt European Community legislation as do-
mestic law.10 5 While the specific terms that a candidate coun-
try must fulfill depend on the situation and status of the
candidate country, certain terms, such as acceptance of the Eu-
ropean and United Nations Conventions on Human Rights, are
universal.
i. The European Convention on Human Rights
In keeping with the EU's aim of promoting human rights,
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Freedoms ("European Convention on Human Rights" or
"ECHR") has been adopted by all present EU members and ac-
ceptance of the Convention is strongly urged upon prospective
member states. 10 6 The ECHR was a treaty established in 1950
by the Council of Europe and implemented in 1953.107 The
Council of Europe, an entity separate and distinct from the EU
and its predecessors, was the first attempt at European unifica-
tion following the end of World War 11.108 The idea for such an
organization was born out of the 1948 Congress of Europe - a
meeting where politicians and scholars representing sixteen
European countries joined to discuss "the desirability of Euro-
pean unity and on the need to institutionalize that ideal by es-
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Declaration of the European Union on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Vienna, 10 December 1998, http://
ec.europa.eulcomm/external relations/human-rights/doc/50th decl_98.htm; see
also UK Law Online, supra note 53.
107 BBC News, Human Rights: The European Convention, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uknews/948143.stm (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
108 DINAN, supra note 19, at 13.
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tablishing an international organization with a parliamentary
body." 0 9
Although the Council of Europe never gained the momen-
tum to become a major driving force behind the unification of
Europe, it did make significant strides in the area of human
rights. 1 0 In 1950, the Council of Europe members signed the
European Convention on Human Rights,"' thereby creating
three institutions: the European Commission on Human Rights,
the European Court of Human Rights, and the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe. 112 The aim of the Conven-
tion and its institutions was and is to protect human rights
across Europe." 3 It allows individual citizens to bring griev-
ances against their home countries on an international level." 14
The Commission on Human Rights is the institution
charged with ensuring that the signatory states adhere to the
terms of the Convention. 1 5 It reviews the applications of par-
ties petitioning review of their cases, looking specifically for er-
rors of law or fact alleged of the domestic courts. 116 The
Commission aids petitioning parties in settling disputes, and in
the event that a settlement cannot be reached, the Commission
has the discretion to refer a case to the Court of Human
Rights. 117
The Court of Human Rights may only hear cases referred to
it by the Commission on Human Rights or brought before it by
signatory states to the Convention. 118 A state petitioning re-
view before the Court of Human Rights must first exhaust all
remedies afforded to it by both its domestic courts and by the
courts of the European Union." 9 Jurisdiction is afforded to the
Court over all issues relating to a signatory state's interpreta-
tion and application of the ECHR. 120
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Human Rights: The European Convention, supra note 107.
112 Id.
113 DINAN, supra note 19, at 13.
114 Human Rights: The European Convention, supra note 107.
115 Stevers, supra note 52, at 952.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 952-53.
118 Id. at 954.
119 Stevers, supra note 52, at 955.
120 Id. at 956.
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The Committee of Ministers is comprised of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of all of the signatory states. 121 Its job is to
review reports drafted by the Commission on Human Rights re-
garding potential human rights abuses. 122 If the abuses are not
referred to the Court of Human Rights within three months of
reviewing the report, the Committee of Ministers may then de-
cide whether a violation has taken place. 123 The Committee's
decisions are binding and enforceable on signatory states. 124
The aim of the signatories to the European Convention on
Human Rights was to:
[R] eaffirm[ I their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are
best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democ-
racy and on the other by a common understanding and obser-
vance of the human rights upon which they depend. 125
Section I of the Convention sets forth the individual human
rights that signatory states are obligated to respect. Included
in this Section, and key for the purposes of this Comment, are
the right to life,126 the right to liberty and security, 127 freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, 128  and freedom of
expression.129
ii. The United Nations' Covenants on Human Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) are both products of the UN's 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 130 Developed in re-
sponse to the atrocious human rights abuses committed during
121 Id. at 957.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, supra note 10.
126 Id., § I, art.2.
127 Id., § I, art.5.
128 Id., § I, art.9.
129 Id., § I, art.10.
130 Kitty Arambulo, Drafting an Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Can an Ideal Become Reality?, 2
U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111 (1996).
2007]
15
PACE INT'L L. REV.
both World Wars, the Universal Declaration was intended to
serve as a human rights standard that people in all UN member
states could aim to achieve. 131 Today, the Universal Declara-
tion is a legally binding commitment by which all United Na-
tions signatory states must abide. 132 The ICESCR and the
ICCPR were both adopted in 1966 and, together with the Uni-
versal Declaration, they form the International Bill on Human
Rights. 133 The ICESCR and the ICCPR are enforced by the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee.134
They protect both individual and collective rights, including the
right to life, liberty, and freedom of thought, as well as the right
to self-determination, to a safe environment, and to peace. 35
Endorsement of these covenants is strongly urged upon appli-
cants for EU membership. 36
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights guarantees that "[A]ll peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely deter-
mine their political status and freely pursue their economic, so-
cial and cultural development."1 37 It also provides that such
rights be "exercised without discrimination of any kind as to
race.. .political or other opinion, national or social origin... or
other status."' 38 In addition, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights declares that "[e]veryone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion."'1 39 It
also guarantees that all people "shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference. 1 40 Finally, a significant protec-
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Jeff Nicolai, Operation Murumbatsuina: A Crime Against Humanity Under
the Rome Statute?, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 813 (2006).
135 Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human
Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 423-24 (2006).
136 LOPEZ GUERRA supra note 9, at 24-25.
137 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra'
note 12, at pt. I, art. 1, para. 1.
138 Id. at pt. I, art 2, para. 2.
139 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 11, at pt.
III, art. 18, para.1.
140 Id. at art. 19, para. 1.
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tion provided by the ICCPR is found in Article 27, which states
that:
[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community, with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion,
or to use their own language. 141
III. THE BASQUE COUNTRY
A. Historical Background
The Basque Country straddles the border between France
and Spain and traditionally is comprised of seven provinces,
three in France and four in Spain. 142 The history of the Basque
people dates back almost two thousand years,'143 and to this
day, the origins of the Basque race and language, which has no
connection to any other indo-European language, remain a mys-
tery. 144 Although they never existed as a single political entity
prior to their integration into Spain,145 the Basque people have
always maintained a unique identity. 46 Spain is a country of
ethnically diverse regions and peoples. 147 It was subject to for-
eign invasions by groups such as the Romans, the Visigoths,
and the Moors, each of which has left lasting imprints. 148 The
Basques resisted the influence of these invaders. 149 While the
last of the four ethnically Basque provinces on the Iberian Pen-
ninsula was incoroporated into the Spanish Kingdom in 1512,
the
Spanish-controlled Basque Country would maintain a high
degree of autonomy for the next three and a half centuries. 50
The Basques were allowed to govern themselves under local
Basque law and customs known as fueros in exchange for politi-
141 Id. at art. 27.
142 RICHARD HERR, ESPAIfA CONTEMPORANEA 18 (2004).
143 MARK KURLANsKY, THE BASQUE HISTORY OF THE WORLD 19 (1999).
144 Id. at 23.
145 Foro Ermua, http://www.foroermua.com/html/index.php (follow "Historia"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
146 KURLANSKY, supra note 143, at 19-26.
147 See HERR, supra note 142, at 59-76.
148 KURLANSKY, supra note 143 at 27-42.
149 Id. at 30-38,
150 See id. at 72, 158.
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cal loyalty to the Spanish monarchy. 151 In a move to strengthen
and reaffirm the centralized government, the Basque Country
was stripped of its fueros completely in 1876 and was fully inte-
grated into the Kingdom of Spain. 152 A Basque nationalist sen-
timent developed steadily thereafter, 15 3 and was enhanced by
the threat posed to Basque language, culture, and customs from
the industrialization and modernization of the region. 5 4 By the
1890s, the Basque Nationalist Party was formed with the aim of
asserting the political rights of the Basque people. 15 5 However,
with the victorious emergence of General Francisco Franco at
the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, the Basque people,
their language, their culture, and their history endured severe
oppression in the name of Spanish unity and nationalism.' 56
B. The Basque Country and ETA
Under the constitutional monarchy of present-day Spain,
the Basque Country enjoys a wide degree of independence from
the central government.' 57 It has its own parliament, police
force, and educational system, as well as taxing power in three
of the four ethnically Basque provinces in Spain.' 58 About sixty
percent of Basque voters are Basque nationalists.' 59 Repre-
sented by the majority-holding moderate Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV), they oppose the Spanish Constitution of 1978,
which enabled the creation of a Basque Autonomous Commu-
nity,' 60 and support a relationship with Spain more akin to that
of the rule by fueros they lost in the late 19th century.16 To the
151 Regina Buono, Delimiting Culture: Implications for Individual Rights in
the Basque Country Today, 39 TEX. INT'L L. J. 143, 145 (2003).
152 KURLANSKY, supra note 143, at 158.
153 Buono, supra note 151, at 145.
154 Id.
155 KURLANSKY, supra note 143, at 161-176.
156 Id. at 211.
157 Buono, supra note 151, at 146.
158 Id.
159 Mark Kurlansky, Unmask the Basques, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada),
Jan. 3, 2003, available at http://basque.unr.edu/02/2.1.p/KurlanskyPDF.pdf.
160 Constituci6n C.E. § 2 and Disposiciones transitorias, available at http:ll
www.congreso.es/ingles/funciones/constitucion/const-espatexto.pdf (English ver-
sion) (last visited 5 Feb. 2007).
161 Id.
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far left is the illegal Batasuna party.162 Supported by about fif-
teen percent of the Basque population, Batasuna was outlawed
in 2003 by the Spanish government for alleged ties to the
Basque militant organization, ETA.163 ETA, the Basque acro-
nym for Euskuadi Ta Askatasuna (meaning Basque Homeland
and Freedom), emerged in 1959 in response to the Franco dicta-
torship's hard-line oppression of the Basque identity.164 It is re-
sponsible for politically motivated assassinations, kidnappings,
and bombings, which have resulted in more than 800 deaths
over the span of four decades. 165 Influenced by Marxist-Lenin-
ist ideology, ETA and its supporters ultimately seek an inde-
pendent Basque socialist state. 166 Historically, they have seen
violence as the only means to achieving their political
objective. 167
In July of 1997, ETA carried out one of its most infamous
attacks against a young Basque citizen. Miguel Angel Blanco
was a twenty-nine year old town councilor representing the
moderate conservative party, Partido Popular, in the Basque
village of Ermua. 16s He was kidnapped on his way to work by
members of ETA. 169 Miguel Angel Blanco's kidnappers de-
manded in a communiqu6 to the Spanish government that ETA
prisoners be relocated from jails across Spain to facilities within
the Basque Country. 170 In keeping with its policy of non-negoti-
ation with ETA, the Spanish government, controlled by the Par-
tido Popular at the time, refused to concede to any of ETA's
demands. 171 Six million people took to the streets across Spain
162 El Pais Special Section on ETA, http://www.elpais.es/articulo/elpporesp/
20041014elpepunac_2/Tes/Historia/Evoluci6n/ETA/(II).
163 Kurlansky, supra note 159.
164 Buono, supra note 151, at 148.
165 Kurlansky, supra note 159.
166 KURLANSKY, supra note 143, at 240.
167 Id.
168 Libertad Digital Special Section on Miguel Angel Blanco, http://www.
libertaddigital.com/suplementos/mab2/001.htm (last visited 18 September 2007)
(follow link to "Introducci6n").
169 Id. (follow link to "El crimen ").
170 Id.
171 Expansi6n: Los 20 dfas que conmovieron Espafia, "ETA asesina a Miguel
Angel Blanco," http://www.expansion.com/especiales/20aniversario/20diasespana/
blanco.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
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to protest the actions of ETA.172 However, despite the immense
opposition, ETA assassinated Blanco when the two-day dead-
line for the Spanish government to act had lapsed. 173
Javier Garcia Gatzelu, also know as Txapote, was one of
the suspects ultimately found guilty for the assassination of
Blanco.174 At trial, the physicians who conducted Blanco's au-
topsy indicated that he had been shot twice in the head at close
range. 175 The first bullet had caused a mere bone fracture, sug-
gesting that Blanco was conscious of having been shot.176 While
they possessed arms of greater caliber, Blanco's assassins used
a small 22-millimeter pistol, which, despite being fired at close
range, resulted in a prolonged and agonizing death. 77
Prompted by increasing domestic and international politi-
cal pressure, ETA announced a cease-fire in March of 2006.178
Its aim was to initialize a democratic process for indepen-
dence.1 79 However, the cease-fire agreement was brought into
grave doubt when, on December 30, 2006, ETA placed a car
bomb in a parking garage at Madrid's Barajas International
Airport, killing two people. i80 The cease-fire was officially ter-
minated in June of 2007, and ETA reinitiated its violent attacks
with a car bomb that exploded outside a Civil Guard station on
August 24, 2007.181
172 Libertad Digital Special Section on Miguel Angel Blanco, supra note 168
(follow "El crimen " hyperlink).
173 Id.
174 Melchor Saiz-Pardo, Miguel Angel Blanco fue asesinado de rodillas, de es-
paldas y con dos tiros a "cai6n tocante," LAS PROVINCIAS, June 21, 2006, available
at http://www.lasprovincias.es/valencia/pg060621/prensa/noticias/Espana/200606/
21NAL-ESP-146.html.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 ETA anuncia un 'alto el fuego permanente,' EL MUNDO (Madrid), Mar. 23,
2006, available at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/03/22/espana/1143026
444.html.
179 Id.
180 BBC News Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6245013.stm (last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2008).
181 ETA reaparece con un coche bomba contra la Guardia Civil en Durango, EL
PAS (Madrid), Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/
ETA/reaparece/coche/bomba/Guardia/Civil/Durango/elpepuesp/20070824el
pepunac-lTes.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING EU MEMBERSHIP TO CARRY
OVER TO AN INDEPENDENT BASQUE COUNTRY
According to international law scholar Stephen Tierney, re-
gionalism, or as he terms it "sub-state nationalism," such as
that seen in the Basque Country, has become increasingly prev-
alent, even as State sovereignty is increasingly yielding to su-
pranational institutions such as the European Union.' 8 2 In Mr.
Tierney's words,
As they observe external challenges to the nation-State,
sub-state national societies situate their own constitutional as-
piration within this environment. It is in this context that their
core aims take on an increasingly international flavour. For ex-
ample: the goal of enhanced constitutional autonomy for the so-
ciety's territorial space now makes reference not only to the
State but also to membership of international organizations;
the search for improved institutional representation for the so-
ciety now targets not only the central State but also the interna-
tional community; and the desire for general recognition of the
society's 'national' status similarly looks to both State and in-
ternational actors for a response.'8 3
Presently, the European Union treaties are silent on
whether EU membership may carry over automatically to
states that have gained independence from one of the twenty-
seven existing EU member states. 84 With the increasing prev-
alence of a European regionalism that rejects the exercise of
control by central governments, but fully embraces the author-
ity of the European Union, 85 it is in the interest of the EU as a
whole to address the EU membership status of such regions.
In answer to an inquiry by a Welsh member of the Euro-
pean Parliament, EU Commission President Romano Prodi
stated in April of 2004 that a "newly independent region would,
by the fact of its independence, become a third country with re-
spect to the Union and the treaties would, from the day of its
182 Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-state National Societies and
Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 161 (2005).
183 Id. at 163.
184 Jo E Murkens & Peter Jones, See A Problem With Independence and the
EU, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Apr. 23, 2004, at 24; Breakaway Regions to Lose EU
Membership, Says Prodi, supra note 7.
185 See Newhouse, supra note 3.
2007]
21
PACE INT'L L. REV.
independence, not apply anymore on its territory."18 6 Oppo-
nents of Prodi's stance, however, claim that his comment was
erroneous.18 7 Leader of the Scottish Nationalist Party, John
Swinney, implied that Prodi's statement was made in his own
political self-interest and that he "was playing to a domestic au-
dience in his native Italy, where the Northern League once
backed independence."18 8 Determining which position the EU
should adopt must depend on which proves to be the most bene-
ficial to the EU as a whole.
Proponents may offer two basic arguments for the Basque
Country retaining EU membership without having to reapply.
The first is that the Basque Country became an official EU
member in 1986 as part of Spain, and since then it has, through
Spain, complied fully with all obligations required of it as an
EU member. Second, in terms of logistics, allowing EU mem-
bership to carry over would cause no significant financial strain
on the EU budget, as all Basques were EU members under
Spain, and it would save the EU institutions from the time con-
suming entry process. However, an independent Basque Coun-
try would, nevertheless, constitute a new state and bring with it
all of the complications that a country applying for first-time
entry brings.
1. Capacity
First, the EU Commission is currently operating at full ca-
pacity with a total of twenty-seven member states represented,
the maximum permitted under the Treaty of Nice.' 8 9 An in-
crease in the number of seats in the Parliament, Commission,
and Council would require approval by all existing member
states.190 Complications in ratifying the treaty would surely
arise given the likelihood of Spain's opposition to any EU ex-
pansion involving EU accession by the Basque Country. In the
event that the Basque Country were permitted to carry over its
membership, the proportion of representation accorded to each
186 Breakaway Regions to Lose EU Membership, Says Prodi, supra note 7.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 13.
190 See Treaty on European Union, supra note 48, at art. 49.
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member state in certain EU institutions, such as the Committee
of the Regions, would also have to be recalculated.
2. Allocation of Funds
Second, along with the introduction of a new member state
would come the need to reallocate EU funds. With the admit-
tance into the EU of an independent Basque Country, a portion
of the funds presently allotted to Spain logically would have to
be reallocated to the Basque Country. Budgetary decisions re-
quire the approval of the Council, the institution representing
national interests. 9 1 Spanish opposition to a reduction in its
allocated funds would likely be strong. Under the terms of the
Luxembourg Compromise, when an issue before the Council re-
lates to "very important interests" of a member state, that state
is entitled to a right of veto. 192 Were Spain to veto a decision to
reallocate a portion of its funds to the Basque Country, the EU
would have to look for alternative means of financing Basque
membership. This would present a financial burden for all EU
member states.
3. Legal Implications
Allowing a carry over of membership would also raise
problems of unfairness in the treatment of EU member states
as well as create potential legal complications. While Spain and
all other current EU member states were required to meet a
series of criteria upon entry, the government heading a newly
independent Basque state would have had to undergo no such
process. Notably, the Basque government would not have to
pledge its respect to the UN Human Rights Covenants or the
European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, there could be
no legal fallback to such documents in order to suspend or expel
the Basques from the EU were human rights abuses to be com-
mitted in the Basque Country, 193 as it is difficult to reprimand a
state for violating an agreement that it never formally made.
This third point becomes all the more worrisome when tak-
ing into account the record of human rights abuses committed
191 DAVIES, supra note 20, at 23.
192 Id. at 24.
193 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 31
(describing failure to comply with Treaty obligation).
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in the Basque Country over the past forty years. The national-
ist Batasuna party has been at the forefront of the violent strug-
gle for Basque self-determination and independence. 194 It was
outlawed in Spain for its ties to the terrorist organization
ETA,195 which is responsible for the deaths of more than 800
victims over four decades. 196 The group has gained infamy for
extorting money, called the Revolutionary Tax, from Basque
businesses to finance its terrorist operations. 197 ETA has
burned down shops of business owners unwilling to pay.198 It
has kidnapped, attacked, and murdered hundreds of Basques
and non-Basques deemed to be in opposition to the struggle for
Basque independence. 199 Many Basque citizens who have
openly protested ETA's violence have been forced out of the
Basque Country for fear of being killed.200 ETA's relentless bat-
tle against innocent civilians, such as Miguel Angel Blanco and
countless others, who stand for democracy and against the vio-
lent imposition of ETA's ideology, exemplifies the organization's
refusal to compromise or tolerate opposing opinions not only of
outsiders, but among Basque citizens themselves. One Basque
politician, Jaime Mayor Oreja, has noted that the trial of
Blanco's assassins has demonstrated that ETA has no intention
of asking for forgiveness or renouncing its political objectives. 20 1
Indeed, Txapote himself stated at trial "I only want to say that
we are militants of ETA and that we are not going to stop until
Euskal Herria [the Basque Country] is free."20 2
Foreseeably, an independent Basque state would be run, at
least in part, by supporters of Batasuna-a party with an
194 See BBC News, Profile:Batasuna, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu-
rope/2211696.stm (last visited August 27, 2007).
195 El Mundo Special Section on the Basque Country, supra note 14 (follow link
to "En Especial;" then follow link to "Proceso de Ilegalizaci6n").
196 Kurlansky, Unmask the Basques, supra note 159.
197 El Mundo Special Section on ETA, supra note 16 (follow "historia" hyper-
link; then follow "la financiaci6n" hyperlink).
198 Id.
199 Id. (follow "Historia" hyperlink).
200 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Website,
La Prensa en el Pais Vasco, Apr. 23, 2003, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URLID=9329&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URL SECTION=201.
201 Libertad Digital Special Section on Miguel Angel Blanco, supra note 168
(follow link to "Jaime Mayor Oreja ").
202 Miguel Angel Blanco fue asesinado de rodillas, de espaldas y con dos tiros a
"cafi6n tocante," supra note 174.
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alarming record of human rights violations. This includes vio-
lations of key provisions in the European Convention on Human
Rights, such as the guarantees of a right to life, liberty, freedom
of thought, and expression, 20 3 as well as in the UN Covenants
on Human Rights, namely an individual's right to self-determi-
nation, 20 4 to freely determine his political status,20 5 and to hold
opinions without interference. 206 Supporters of the Batasuna
party, ETA, and other related organizations have blatantly dis-
regarded the rights of their fellow citizens by condoning attacks
on those who have spoken in opposition to the Nationalist
cause.
As one of the regions that led the industrial revolution in
Spain, the Basque Country has attracted non-Basque
Spaniards to settle in the region in search of work for more than
a century. 20 7 Consequently, the Basque Country has a signifi-
cant population of non-ethnic Basques who are opposed to the
Basque initiative for independence. 20 8 In the event that the
Basque Country were to separate from Spain, non-ethnic
Basques, whose families may have lived and worked in the
Basque Country for generations, could face serious risk of per-
secution in a primarily ethnic Basque state. This raises alarm
for the potential violation of article 27 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights which states, "[i]n those
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community, with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own relig-
ion, or to use their own language."20 9 Thus far, the European
Union has been adamant in demanding guarantees from pro-
spective member states against human rights abuses in those
countries. Such is true with Turkey and its on-going negotia-
203 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, supra note 10, at § I, arts. 2, 5, 9, 10.
204 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 12, at pt. I, art. 1, para.1.
205 Id.
206 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 11, at pt.
III, art. 19, para.1.
207 KURLANSKY, supra note 143, at 168-69.
208 Id.
209 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 11, at pt.
III, art. 27.
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tions with the EU to gain admittance, 210 as well as the newly
admitted Bulgaria and Romania, who were compelled to imple-
ment numerous policies safeguarding human rights within
their borders prior to accession. 211 Thus, to remain consistent
and faithful to its pledge to promote and protect the human
rights of its citizens, the EU would have to deny the Basque
Country the ability to retain its EU membership upon gaining
independence.
V. EU POLICY SHOULD REQUIRE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES
TO REAPPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP
The historical development of the European Union reflects
a commitment across an array of nations to attain common in-
stitutions and policies that are respected and upheld by all.
With the creation of the EU, its founding member states sought
to promote unity and equality among not only the states them-
selves, but among all of their citizens as well. Such is evidenced
on the one hand by the structural institutions of the EU, provid-
ing all member states with an equal degree of representation,
and on the other hand by the EU's adoption of various interna-
tional human rights agreements, which are required to be rati-
fied by all entering states.
Allowing breakaway nations to retain their EU member-
ship status without having to reapply would upset the balance
among EU states and disrupt the progress the EU has made in
creating an institution rooted in democracy and the rule of law.
Each member's proportion of representation in the EU's gov-
erning institutions would require reallocation, as would the
EU's budget, something that most current member states would
likely oppose. Member states that have lost breakaway regions
would undoubtedly resent these newly independent states. Dis-
sention among the EU members would lead to difficulties in
working together productively, thus frustrating the goal of a
unified Europe. Furthermore, important controls designed to
210 See Human Rights News, Turkey: Curbs on Assembly Undermine EU Bid,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/28/turkey8501.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2007)
211 See Amnesty International, Bulgaria and Romania: Amnesty Interna-
tional's Human Rights Concerns in the EU Accession Countries,, http://web.am-
nesty.org/libraryIndex/ENGEUR020012005?open&of=ENG-2U2 (last visited Nov.
13, 2007).
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promote the aim of attaining an "ever closer union"212 of states
that guarantees the protection of important individual rights
would be dangerously neglected. This could open the door to
legal complications that could not be solved as readily as with
member states that have undergone the full accession process.
A sidestepping of the normal entry process could thus destroy
the human rights guarantees that the EU strives to promote.
Considering the disastrous implications of permitting an inde-
pendent Basque Country to retain EU membership, it is in the
best interest of the EU, its institutions, and its citizens to re-
quire breakaway nations to reapply for accession to the EU
upon gaining independence from an EU member state.
212 See Treaty on European Union, supra note 48.
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